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ABSTRACT 
 
 Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping China is taking ambitious strides 
towards greater economic and political influence globally, seeking to establish itself as great 
power by all definitions. Recently, one policy pushing towards that goal is the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) initiative which will expand on trade routes and resource pipelines over land 
and sea reaching to Africa, the Middle East, and even Europe. The land leg of BRI is the Silk 
Road Economic Belt (SREB) which passes through Central Asia before reaching the desired 
destinations, making the region critical to China’s goals for BRI. Through an analytical review 
of China’s past behavior in similar developing regions I will identify a pattern which 
indicates how China will develop Central Asia for its Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, I 
will explore the connection between trade, FDI, and political influence using a statistical test 
of UN voting behavior. I will also discuss how BRI presents China with the opportunity for 
growth of political influence in the region on top of the economic benefits, but that new 
costs and challenges, potentially increased by Russian efforts, will limit China’s political 
gains. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
China is a returning superpower, having demonstrated its ability to rise to a level of 
influence and relevance similar to what it held throughout history when it was known as the 
‘middle kingdom’ of Asia.1 By successfully transitioning from colonial exploitation to a 
Soviet-style communist state into an independent socialist state with a hybrid market 
economy, China has achieved great economic growth in the past century, rising to compete 
with the United States for first in terms of total GDP depending on the measure. While 
China has achieved great political and economic success, it has yet to achieve a position of 
leadership in the international system. China has reclaimed a place of relevance after 
decades of foreign exploitation, war, and self-inflicted catastrophes. Today, China has 
attained membership within the World Trade Organization (WTO), is a powerful part of the 
global economy, and has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. China 
uses economic power as its primary method for pursuing its national interest abroad, and it 
has been an effective vehicle for China’s global rise. However, Beijing seeks more than just 
economic might, desiring a comprehensive power that covers multiple areas.2 To this end, 
the Chinese leadership has sought to increase both China’s military power and its soft 
power. Soft Power here is defined as co-opting or coercing the other party without force, 
such as through cultural methods; in short, soft power means getting another state to want 
the same things you want and have the same ideals you have.3 The Chinese leadership 
                                                 
1 The term middle kingdom is a translation of the traditional name of China that was used by Chinese rulers 
and other Asian countries during various historical periods. 
2 David Shambaugh, China goes Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5 
3 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80, (1990), 619 
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believes that soft power, along with their established economic power and a strong military, 
is a necessity for its ascension as a great power and realization of China’s foreign policy 
goals.4 Regarding the aspect of military power, China continues to lag behind other great 
powers in force projection capability. Unlike states such as the United States, Great Britain, 
and Russia, China lacks a true ‘blue water’ navy. Blue water navy is a term used by analysts 
to describe a state’s ability to project its power through the sea to other parts of the world. 
While not the sole reason China is reliant on non-military might, this lack contributes 
significantly to the limitations on hard power options faced by Chinese leaders. Beijing 
cannot rely on a hard power option if other methods fail to the same degree as other great 
powers. Economic power remains China’s strongest individual component of its 
comprehensive state power. This economic reliance means trade and investment are crucial 
to China’s power base. President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the largest 
current economic initiative and is described as the “central foreign policy undertaking” of 
President Xi’s tenure.5 The Belt and Road Initiative is a proposed network of countries and 
infrastructure to facilitated economic and energy resource trade between multiple 
countries that would stretch from China to Europe. BRI could have a large impact on the 
economic and political order due to its ‘vast’ size, its importance to President Xi, and 
because it is a challenge to the United States and other great powers.6 This Belt and Road 
                                                 
4 Jae Ho Chung, "Decoding the Evolutionary Path of Chinese Foreign Policy 1949-2009." East Asia 28, (2011), 
182 
5 Werner Fasslabend, “The Silk Road: A political marketing concept for world dominance.” European View 14, 
(2015), 294 
6 “Our bulldozers, our rules,” Foreign Policy, The Economist July 2nd, 2016 
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Initiative, often shortened to Belt and Road, is critical to understanding China’s future 
development as a great power.7 
President Xi Jinping is leading China forward at a quickening pace, enacting reforms 
of the military, the economy, and consolidating his power base. As China regains its great 
power status, new challenges will arise, and current tensions will grow. Human rights issues, 
the status of Taiwan, territory conflicts in the South China sea, unfair trade practices: these 
will only grow in importance as China asserts itself. President Xi has adopted a proactive 
foreign policy, increasing China’s activities abroad, such as opening its first military base on 
foreign soil in Djibouti in 2017.8 President Xi is departing from the methods of his 
immediate predecessors with more aggressive strategies, which also creates greater 
pressure to deliver results.9 Belt and Road is one such strategy as it is an ambitious initiative 
meant to grow China’s economic power, international influence, and regional leadership. A 
critical region for the success of BRI is Central Asia, which serves as the gateway from 
western China to the rest of the proposed Belt and Road network. China will have to further 
develop both its political relationship with several Central Asian states and its economic 
infrastructure for Belt and Road to work, such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Central Asia will 
provide an informative case as China both asserts itself abroad and grows its influence.  
This work seeks first to establish the model for understanding how China behaves in 
developing regions, and second, to apply that model to understand how China’s BRI 
                                                 
7 The Belt and Road Initiative was originally labeled the “One Belt, One Road” initiative.  
8 “China formally opens first overseas military base in Djibouti,” Reuters August 1st, 2017  
9 Cheng Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2016), 25 
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development projects will affect Central Asia. Understanding each of these will provide 
important insights into Chinese foreign policy through a greater understanding of the 
capabilities and limitations of China as a great power. How China has wielded its influence 
previously will help to demonstrate how it will exert itself as a great power in other regions.  
This study will contribute to defining China’s role among other Great Powers and what the 
future of the international system will look like with a more powerful China implementing 
more active foreign policy.  
China will use investment, infrastructure development, and political support in 
Central Asia to meet the economic and political goals behind the Belt and Road initiative. I 
will illustrate the potential strategies China will employ through analysis of China’s past 
behavior in developing countries. China’s goals for relationships with developing states 
combined with the domestic conditions in the recipient state inform the model for China’s 
actions, and the resulting effects in Central Asia. While many factors are relevant, this 
general model of behavior will establish four factors as most relevant: a state’s initial 
resource value, the diversity of its economy, the stability of its economy, and the presence 
or absence of other potential investors. Through further analysis, I will propose that China is 
likely to achieve economic goals and short-term growth of political influence, but ultimately 
fall short of its larger political goals, especially soft power gains for Belt and Road in Central 
Asia. As a specific example of this potential outcome, I argue that China will hold greater 
influence in Tajikistan, while conditions in Kazakhstan will limit Beijing’s influence. In both 
cases the influence will be economic based, restricting the potential of political or soft 
power gains. 
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source: Mercator Institute for China Studies10  
Belt and Road Initiative 
Proposed in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative is a developing 
economic trade network planned to stretch from China all the way to Europe. Belt and Road 
builds upon existing roads, pipelines, and railroads in some areas while planning to create 
new infrastructure in others. These routes would stretch over land as the Silk Road 
Economic Belt (SREB) and over sea as the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), as shown in Figure 1. 
The SREB would have two main corridors, with several offshoots and hub cities. It would 
                                                 
10 https://www.merics.org/en/china-mapping/silk-road-initiative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Graphic Representation of the Belt and Road Initiative  
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begin in Xi’an, capital of Shaanxi province in western China, and continue west crossing 
Central Asia, the Middle East, possibly Russia, and finally end in Europe. The MSR has one 
primary sea corridor, also with many hubs and offshoots.  The MSR would start in China’s 
southeastern ports, travel along the coast of southeast Asia, around India, connect with the 
Persian Gulf, and end in the Mediterranean Sea. These different sub branches of the SREB 
and the MSR would create a multi-national network connecting China to East Africa, the 
Middle East, and Europe. This will facilitate trade, improve access to foreign energy 
resources and give China access to new markets. As stated by Chinese agencies for 
commerce, foreign affairs, and national development reform, China’s goals for Belt and 
Road are: 
1. “Building and upgrading transport infrastructure along the major trade routes 
between China and other countries, including ports, airports, railways, highways and 
even satellites; 
2. Improving market access, eliminating trade barriers, simplifying foreign investment 
processes and building more free trade zones in the region; 
3. Pushing for simpler customs clearance system including quarantine procedures to 
encourage more trade; 
4. Encouraging greater cooperation in the field of natural resources exploration and 
extraction. Many developing countries around China are rich in natural resources such 
as former Soviet Republics in central Asia. 
5. Apart from investing in infrastructure, another important aspect of this policy is to 
build stronger financial ties between China and other developing countries in Asia. 
This includes the development of a Pan-Asian bond market, greater use of Chinese 
currency in bilateral trades. 
6. Beijing-backed multilateral financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, the BRICS Development Bank and the Silk Road Fund are expected 
to play an important role in strengthening financial ties. 
7. There are also softer elements of more students, cultural, medical and tourist 
exchanges.”11 
                                                 
11 Peter Cai, “China’s Ambitious New Marshall Plan for Asia,” The Australian March 31st, 2015 
7 
 
If completed as planned, BRI will impact 65 countries, three continents, and roughly two 
thirds of the world’s population. Belt and Road will require cooperation and agreements 
with over a dozen states along the route, greatly expanding not only China’s economic 
connections to these regions, but also its political relationships. This, in turn, will expand 
China’s sphere of influence into areas traditionally under the purview of other great 
powers.  
Central Asia will be a critical region to BRI, especially to the SREB, as much of the 
belt’s various routes and pipelines run through the region. They pass through Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, with cities like Dushanbe as hubs for the BRI network. The 
actions and successes of China in Central Asia, and pre-existing conditions in the region, will 
both have a major impact on the success of BRI and the achievement of China’s future 
goals. Beyond the BRI itself, Central Asia is an important area of influence for Russia and has 
a historical role in great power politics. China wading into Russia’s ‘backyard’ will create 
ripples in the international system, which gives China’s actions in Central Asia additional 
importance. Due to this change, understanding China’s influence in Central Asia is crucial to 
understanding China’s role in the international system as well as its future relations with 
Russia. 
 
Theory and Method 
This work intends to address several questions about China in Central Asia. What 
methods are likely to be employed to achieve the goals of the Belt and Road Initiative? 
Combined with pre-existing conditions, what will be the subsequent effects on Central Asia 
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states? How will BRI affect China? What effect, if any, will there be on the international 
system? How will this affect Sino-Russian relations? While none of these questions have a 
definite answer, we can begin to understand the factors involved and outline the shape of 
those answers.  
The strategies China will employ in Central Asia are not entirely novel. China 
approaches change slowly, carefully exploring new strategies and political methods. This 
makes the creation of an entirely new strategy specific to Central Asia unlikely. Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous statement that reforms are best tackled by “crossing the river by feeling 
the stones” has become an apt description for China’s modern political strategy.12 China’s 
policies through the second half of the 20th century went through cycles of fang and shou, 
an ‘opening’ and ‘tightening’ in alternating periods. Essentially policies would become less 
oppressive for a period, allowing more political activity and reform, but then become more 
oppressive again when China’s leadership decided reform had gone too far.13 This process 
results in an incremental forward progress, testing policies at a careful pace.  
This lack of radical shifts in policy is relevant to this work because it supports the key 
assumption that China will continue to follow a similar pattern of behavior in the new BRI 
development in Central Asia as it has in other developing regions before. I will conduct a 
literature analysis of China’s economic and political relationships with developing states in 
regions in the global south. The term ‘developing nations’ is a broadly used term without a 
simple clear definition. For the purposes of this work, it describes states that meet most, 
                                                 
12 Richard Baum, 1994. Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 17   
13Baum, Burying Mao, 5 
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but not necessarily all, of the following conditions: they are a lower than 20th in global 
GDP(PPP); they are not classified as a developed economy by the IMF or World Bank; they 
are not classified as a developed nation by the UN; and they are not a stable democracy or 
they have recently transitioned to democracy. My approach and the model I will build fit 
into the tenets of neo-liberalism. China applies its economic might to create ties through 
trade and investment with developing states, growing its relationship with the recipient 
states and its economy simultaneously. The Belt and Road Initiative itself creates a supra-
state level organization for participant states to cooperate and interact. Economic 
integration of the states through BRI will affect states’ interaction with each other. The level 
of involvement and benefit from BRI will create a hierarchy within the network, with China 
at the top. With this understanding, I will examine how China is establishing Belt and Road 
in Central Asia, and what that means for China’s place in the international order.  
 
Initial Factors 
My analysis begins with China’s initial engagement with the recipient state.  First, a 
potential recipient must possess something of specific interest to China. While there can be 
other possibilities, this first condition is almost always an energy resource, such as oil. While 
the growing Chinese state has many needs, energy resources are of the highest priority. 
Frequently in developing regions this initial interest in oil determines if China develops a 
significant economic relationship or not. Next in the analysis is how China invests in and 
develops these states. Chinese methods vary depending upon certain economic conditions, 
two of which I will focus on here. One is the ‘health’ of the recipient economy. A healthy 
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economy in this work is a combination of two factors: weakness and stability. Weakness 
specifically refers to raw performance of the economy, such as GDP; stability refers to 
likelihood the current economic performance will continue. Next, there is economic 
diversity: is it driven by multiple products or by a single valuable resource? These two are 
often are connected to each other, and together provide the most significant factors 
determining Chinese behavior once it is committed to investment in a state. Nigeria’s 
relatively more diverse and healthy economy made it appealing to China beyond just energy 
resources. China’s interest in Sudan was more limited due to the instability and unhealthy 
economy present before China invested. The final domestic condition I will focus on is the 
presence of other wealthy states, especially great powers, as competing interested 
investors in the recipient state. The state’s international credit rating, humanitarian record, 
or government often plays a role in determining this.  This factor can limit China’s interest 
or provide the recipient state with a position from which to negotiate. These domestic 
conditions will then result in different relationship structures with China, partially due to 
different strengths of bargaining positions relative to other recipient states. When a state 
has an unhealthy economy centered around energy resources, China is more likely to limit 
its development to extraction of that resource. With a healthy economy, Chinese firms will 
invest in broader development to create a more appealing market. This will lead up to the 
model developed at the end of this work. 
China always possesses the strongest bargaining position, of course, but there is 
variance in the relative positions of the recipient states which depend on the domestic 
conditions I identify. China’s goals also vary, ranging from a new market for Chinese labor to 
11 
 
greater political influence or acquiring energy resources. Typical strategies employed by 
China are direct investment, purchasing of oil or other energy resources, infrastructure 
development, and arms sales. China is the only major arms exporter that does not have any 
stipulations regarding civil or human rights.14 This is part of China’s non-interference 
approach to bilateral relations based on its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,15 which 
also allows China to place very few conditions on its investments in developing states. Some 
of these principles, such as equal benefit for both parties, are present more in rhetoric than 
in practice, but David Shambaugh describes them as a lasting hallmark of Chinese foreign 
policy. The model built from the historical analysis will then be applied to Central Asia. I will 
also include discussion of similar states in different regions who did not attract Chinese 
investment and development to strengthen which factors are most significant in 
determining Chinese behavior in a recipient state.  
For my statistical test of the political effects of China’s economic efforts, I will use an 
emerging standard of measure for political affiliation in statistical studies, UN voting habits. 
My test will evaluate the UN voting behavior of developing states with certain domestic 
conditions that have received a significant amount of FDI and trade from China. I will test 
for both a combined total of trade and FDI and FDI by itself. While UN votes are often on 
non-binding or symbolic measures, they can contribute to the understanding of political 
affinity between states. The ordinary least squares regression will be performed with 
controls for conditions in Central Asia, such as economic strength, region, and credit 
                                                 
14 Ian Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” Internal Affairs 82, no. 5 (2006), 949. 
15 The Five Principles are mutual respect for state sovereignty, mutual non-aggression between states, mutual 
non-interference in internal affairs of other states, mutual and equal benefit, and finally peaceful coexistence. 
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standing. The statistical test will explore any connection between China’s economic power 
and gains in political influence in developing states.   
China will use investment, infrastructure development, and political support in 
Central Asia to meet economic and political goals behind the BRI initiative. Certain domestic 
conditions in the recipient state will suggest China’s actions, and the resulting shape of 
Central Asia with a more active China. The weaker the bargaining position of the state, the 
more Beijing can secure favorable terms for itself. While China often focuses on 
development only where the recipient state is in a vulnerable position, absolute gains are 
still possible. Understanding how China will behave in Central Asia will provide important 
insight into the future success of Belt and Road specifically, and President Xi’s more 
aggressive foreign policy overall.  
 
Limitations 
Chinese policies are evolving, albeit carefully, and BRI is in one of the most ambitious 
undertakings of President Xi’s tenure. There is no true precedent for comparison. There 
may be unidentified aspects in Central Asia that would alter the application of this model. 
This model is also susceptible to changes in Chinese domestic politics. Belt and Road 
Initiative may undergo serious changes or reductions if there is a shift in the economy or 
party priorities. I have endeavored in my case studies not to ignore any relevant factor in 
Chinese behavior. These strategies have been employed in the unrelated regions of Africa 
and South America, and I have demonstrated the Chinese reticence for sudden significant 
changes in policy. Chinese political leadership favors stability and proven options over 
13 
 
untested higher risk new methods. China’s need for new economic growth and the desire to 
develop their great power status, especially in their immediate region, are not likely to 
change. China is entering a new period of greater global activity, and the dynamic 
leadership of President Xi Jinping creates a greater possibility for change. This could limit 
the usefulness of this model for exploring future Chinese foreign policy.  
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CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 To understand how China will develop the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia I 
will review China’s past development behavior in similar regions. The following analytical 
review will begin with the current academic discussion about Belt and Road, Chinese foreign 
policy under President Xi Jinping, and then continue with China’s relationship with recipient 
states. I will examine China’s initial steps with a recipient state, and then how that 
relationship progresses and serves China’s interests. The review will conclude with a 
discussion of China’s challenges to gaining greater soft power internationally.    
Academic discussions of the Belt and Road Initiative can be grouped into political or 
economic discussions. Is BRI viewed as a geopolitical power play by President Xi Jinping or is 
it mainly a vehicle to support domestic economic growth? Belt and Road has been viewed 
as a way for China to gain more influence in emerging world markets, to secure energy 
resources through direct investment, to balance inadequate domestic demand, promote its 
own currency, counter other great power influence, and strengthen diplomatic ties with 
partner nations that provide China with a geopolitical advantage. The division into 
economic and political categories is a simplification to organize the discussions of Belt and 
Road.  
 
China’s Goals for Foreign Trade and Investment 
 Through its foreign economic relationships, especially in the developing world, China 
seeks to feed its ravenous energy demands, create new markets for Chinese companies to 
relieve concerns about the domestic economy, and further establish itself as great power. 
15 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative fits into these goals neatly with very similar aims. The goals of 
the BRI as stated by Theresa Fallon are “(1) energy, (2) security, (3) markets.”16 Belt and 
Road implementation can be broken down into five areas, “…policy coordination, 
infrastructure construction, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people 
ties.”17 Jae Ho Chung describes China’s foreign policy in the new millennium as “a great 
reversal” of the approach adopted after Mao, with “enormous aid-in-grant packages being 
offered” to the Third World. Chung continues to state “China wants natural resources and 
energy, as well as political support…therefore [China’s support] is highly interest-based” 
instead of being ideological.18 Yiping Huang believes China’s previous model of economic 
success “relied mainly on export and investment” which was driven by the manufacturing 
industry. Recent indicators “suggest that China’s past growth model has run its course” and 
“it now requires a new model to support economic development” which will have an 
“important international dimension” which is “to assert greater influence on international 
economic governance, starting from a specific regional trade and investment initiative.”19 
President Xi’s BRI is one such initiative. China considers international influence and greater 
soft power as critical to solidifying its status as a great power and is allocating more 
resources towards this goal. President Xi has stated that China is committed to sharing the 
benefits of development globally, and to defend globalization overall. Elizabeth Economy 
states “…if there had been any doubts concerning Xi’s commitment, they were 
                                                 
16 Theresa Fallon, “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia,” American Foreign Policy 
Interests 37, no 3 (2015), 140 
17 Junhua Zhang, “What’s Driving China’s One Belt One Road Initiative,” East Asia Forum, September 2nd, 2016  
18 Chung, “Decoding the Evolutionary Path,” 180  
19 Yiping Huang, “Understanding China’s Belt & Road Initiative: motivation, framework, and assessment,” 
China Economic Review 40, (2016), 317  
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allayed…when Xi became the first Chinese President to travel to the epicenter of 
globalization, the World Economic Forum’s annual January gathering…and deliver yet 
another rousing defense of globalization.”20 The importance of leadership among smaller 
states is understood to be a part of this and plays a role in China’s behavior with the 
developing world. For example, when discussing this aspect, Chung states China’s main 
audience for its “anti-hegemonic discourse (bu chengba bu dangtou) should not be other 
great powers (e.g., the U.S. and Russia) but smaller nations” demonstrating the importance 
those states hold form the viewpoint of Beijing.21 President Xi intends for BRI to further 
these goals as a part of China’s greater foreign policy strategy. Most of the discussion 
surrounding BRI focuses on either its economic or geopolitical purpose, with differing 
opinions in both camps regarding its likelihood of success.  
 
Belt and Road Initiative – Geopolitical Perspectives 
Scholars have taken note that China has been actively working to increase its 
influence around the world through image building, cooperation, investment and 
infrastructure development. China seeks greater soft power in addition to economic and 
political influence, as China believes this is an element of great power status. Fallon has 
written extensively on China’s efforts to gain political influence. She describes how the idea 
of the rejuvenation of China is directly tied to China’s ascension as a great power, with BRI 
playing a central role as “an expression of China’s confidence and international clout.”22 
                                                 
20 Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 231  
21 Chung, “Decoding the Evolutionary Path,” 185  
22 Fallon, “The New Silk Road,” 141  
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Nadege Rolland also describes BRI as the possible mechanism for realizing President Xi’s 
objective of rejuvenation, which he defines as restoring China to its “pre-nineteenth century 
grandeur and influence.”23 Belt and Road planning and announcements peaked in 2015 and 
2016 and was the primary focus of China’s diplomatic efforts in 2014 and 2015.24 This 
timing indicated it could partially be a response to the Asia pivot by the U.S., with China 
wanting to establish itself as the leader in the region instead. It has also been described as 
China’s Marshall Plan, conveying a heavy geopolitical clout. Ferdinand believes this 
description comes because of the aspects of large scale infrastructure development, greater 
connectivity between states, and its penitential to “fundamentally rebalance global 
economic geography.”25 Whether likened to the Marshall Plan or not, a great deal of 
discussion of Belt and Road focused on the geopolitical potential of new Chinese foreign 
policy signaled by the actions of President Xi Jinping.  
President Xi himself is frequently discussed as an important aspect to the study of 
Belt and Road. Tom Miller states: “There is little doubt that President Xi sees the Belt and 
Road as a practical step towards realizing the strategic goal of national rejuvenation” 
domestically and helping to solidify President Xi’s legacy.26 Considered perhaps the most 
powerful and ambitious Chinese leader in recent times, President Xi strives to be a stronger 
leader than his predecessor Hu Jintao. He has created a new focus on asserting the political 
leadership and ideology of the CCP, equating the nature of the party, dangxing, with the 
                                                 
23 Nadege Rolland, “China’s New Silk Road,” National Bureau of Asian Research (2015), 1  
24 Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the One Belt, One Road Initiative,” China Leadership 
Monitor no 47, (2015), 1-2 
25 Peter Ferdinand, “Westward Ho – the China dream and One Belt One Road: Chinese foreign policy under Xi 
Jinping,” International Affairs 92, no 4 (2016), 951   
26 Tom Miller, China’s Asian Dream (London: Zed Books 2017), 33 
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nature of the people, renminxing.27 President Xi has built upon several existing concepts to 
create his picture for the future of China. The image campaign began under President Hu 
Jintao has intensified during President Xi’s tenure.28 The existing ‘China dream’ ideal has 
been re-emphasized as the ‘New China Dream’ under President Xi, becoming one of the 
primary ideological principles of his regime. However, President Xi’s China Dream still lacks 
a clear definition, discussed in speeches and statements without any detailed explanation. 
Peter Ferdinand believes that, overall, foreign policy under President Xi has lost its cautious 
nature and became more bold and optimistic.29 The idea of a renewed silk road is also not 
new, but similar to the new China dream, it has become a focus of President Xi with the BRI 
initiative. President Xi’s approach to foreign policy has been described as departing from 
previous “risk-adverse” strategies to more “risk-embracing” ones.30 President Xi seeks to 
lead China into a new stronger status as world power, and Belt and Road may be his 
geopolitical vehicle for doing just that.  
Werner Fasslabend focuses on the geopolitical aspects of Belt and Road because he 
feels that is precisely what sets it apart from past silk road concepts.31 Belt and Road is then 
considered uniquely President Xi’s strategy for a new geopolitical leadership role for China 
and central to his presidency. He has even tailored his language and presentation of the 
initiative to be distinct, choosing to refer to it as an ‘economic belt’ instead of a ‘new silk 
road’ so it would not be confused with other past initiatives such as Hillary Clinton’s 
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proposed vision.32 While China’s changes in strategy are rarely drastic, we are seeing the 
biggest shift in modern times. Ferdinand views these riskier steps taken by President Xi’s 
regime in foreign policy to move China outside of its current sphere of influence will have 
repercussions for Chinese leaders for decades to come and are particularly astonishing 
given the level of domestic political control the regime feels is necessary.33  
Fallon also touches on the more aggressive foreign policy aspects, discussing how 
measures like Belt and Road are part of Beijing’s efforts to influence policy decisions in 
other spheres, like the European Union.34 Fallon also discusses the security aspect of Belt 
and Road more than any other scholar. She included it as one of the three main goals 
mentioned previously. Fallon explains BRI can create a common economic community that 
will promote development, boost trade, and attract foreign investment, “…thereby enhance 
stability and security…” in the region. She continues to quote a Major General in the 
People’s Liberation Army saying that the economic carrot provided by Belt and Road will 
provide a solution to many of China’s border security problems.35 While not described as 
security, necessarily, this concept is echoed in Rolland’s discussion of “infrastructure 
diplomacy” by China, which is exemplified through Belt and Road. Rolland states that 
infrastructure diplomacy “…reflects a diplomatic imperative to strengthen relations around 
the continental periphery…” which she feels is central to China’s diplomatic strategy.36 
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Domestic political concerns are also addressed by Belt and Road. Beijing is becoming 
increasingly concerned about regional and ethnic disparity, especially in the region of 
Xinjiang where tensions have continued to grow in response to President Xi’s opposition to 
ethnic autonomy.37 Rolland describes how the BRI fits into the belief by Beijing “…that the 
political and ethnic tensions in Xinjiang can be attenuated by economic development…” 
which will increase with Belt and Road.38 Fallon also states that policy makers see BRI as “..a 
way to help the economic development of China’s less advanced central and western 
provinces” as they would see further investment because of the increased trade 
opportunities provided form the Belt and Road infrastructure development.39 This will 
alleviate political tensions in these regions, which Beijing feels largely stem from economic 
inequality. While domestic concerns tend to be economic, as will be discussed later, they 
bleed over into the political arena. Any discussion of Belt and Road, economic or political, 
cannot be disconnected from domestic concerns.  
The ‘middle kingdom’ has employed many methods to increase its international 
influence and image, ranging from non-governmental areas such as media, sports, and 
exchange programs to state directed foreign policy think tanks, diplomatic conferences, and 
military outreach organizations.40 China’s attempt to reshape its image and foster 
cooperation, described as a “Charm Offensive,” was bolstered by the 2008 financial crisis. 
This global economic weakness provided an opportunity for China as a relatively stable 
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economic powerhouse in the region, granting it more leverage to shift “away from 
reassurance and towards assertiveness and coercion” in its approach.41 Through this 
mixture of ‘charm’ and ‘host diplomacy,’ China has been successful in quieting its critics in 
the region and achieving a relatively cooperative environment with its neighbors. However, 
in the context of China’s ultimate goals of greater influence and being viewed on par with 
world powers such as the United States or Russia, that success has been limited.42 
According to many of China’s own political analysts, Beijing has failed to establish itself as a 
leader and instead, just become a friendly neighbor.43 More is needed to adopt that 
leadership role, and if BRI is successful it could be that extra step, but there are many 
obstacles.  
Most analysts are unwilling to make predictions about the level of success, or 
failure, that Belt and Road will experience at this point in its development, but there is 
discussion of the challenges it faces. Michael Du states that one major obstacle may be that 
the size of the infrastructure development needed in multiple countries along the BRI will 
prove too much for China’s capacity, which with improper implementation could lead BRI to 
“…end up as little more than a series of expensive boondoggles.”44 Fasslabend is perhaps 
slightly more optimistic, believing that BRI must be taken seriously and is likely to shape 
Chinese foreign policy for many years to come, but also describes major obstacles in its way, 
such as the “huge differences between the economic, political, cultural, social and legal 
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systems..” in the different regions involved in Belt and Road.45 Ferdinand describes BRI as a 
new state where geopolitical intentions play a greater role in China’s foreign policy, looming 
over its economic ones. He sees the challenge for BRI stemming from its assumption that 
China’s partner states in the network will be “enthusiastic” and that “…without their active 
cooperation the project will fail…” with serious repercussions for Chinese politics.46 While 
many reserve judgements on Belt and Road’s prospects, there is an echoed sentiment that 
China’s full goals for Belt and Road are likely beyond its ability to fulfill. It is unclear if Beijing 
internally holds the same expectations for Belt and Road as have been touted in its 
speeches and propaganda, which may play a role in how truly successful Belt and Road is in 
the eyes of the CCP leadership.  
 
Belt and Road Initiative – Economic Perspectives 
While certainly its geopolitical aspects are important, and the long-term goals are 
about its political interests, Belt and Road’s economic nature certainly cannot be ignored. It 
is foremost an economic network of participating states, with the primary purpose of 
facilitating trade, improving market access, building financial ties, and involvement of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and natural resource extraction.47 As such, 
much of its scholarship has been focused on the economic aspects. Belt and Road is seen, 
least in part, as a direct answer to China’s domestic economic issues despite the fact that 
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approximately one third of the worlds wealth would be impacted by Belt and Road.48 
Leonard Cheng summarizes the proposed true economic objectives of Belt and Road to be 
conquering world markets to relieve pressure from China’s excess production capacity, 
secure natural resources for China, promote the Renminbi’s internationalization and 
adoption as a foreign reserve currency, and to counter the U.S.’s Asian Pivot and Trans-
Pacific Partnership.49 These coincide with two of Fallon’s three identified goals, markets and 
energy. Cheng’s article counters the idea that Belt and Road is truly a Chinese Marshall plan, 
stating there are many differences between today and the post WWII setting. Cheng 
explains further that China’s “real objectives are much more limited” than geopolitical 
theorists have argued, with the “official objectives…to be achievable only for a subset…” of 
Belt and Road countries. He concludes that it is “highly questionable that China has either 
the ambition or the capability to pursue a grand economic and geopolitical 
strategy…comparable to the above-mentioned U.S. global grand strategy in the post-WWII 
era.”50 Similarly, Peter Cai believes the geopolitical takes on Belt and Road are ignoring the 
key motivations of Chinas domestic economic concerns.51 Huang, as discussed above, also 
focuses on the domestic economic factors as driving BRI. Huang further explains that three 
factors “triggered” China’s Belt and Road Initiative: the slowing of China’s previous 
economic growth plan, it has outgrown its low profile in international affairs, and finally 
that the “existing international economic system is no longer compatibility with the new 
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reality of a world economy where emerging market economics already play important 
roles.”52 Cem Nalbantoglu also believes domestic interests are the focus of Belt and Road, 
stating it is designed to address multiple aspects of China’s domestic problems, concluding 
that BRI “…looks out for the China’s internal problems, rather than the matters regarding 
foreign policy…” and is a “…fixer for China’s domestic challenges.”53 China’s leadership is 
seeing the possible end of their current model of sustaining domestic GDP growth. It needs 
new markets and a new strategy to maintain its domestic economy, and Belt and Road may 
provide that solution, and as Nalbantoglu believes, may even be designed specifically for it. 
One of the more important aspects of BRI is to create a regional economic production chain, 
one that by design provides the greatest benefit for China at the center.54 
For states who participate in Belt and Road, China provides access to a large market 
of consumers who can handle any volume of goods from emerging economies. Through this 
new economic corridor and the structure of BRI, China seeks to establish itself as part of the 
global economic leadership, not by replacing the current leadership but integrating into the 
existing system.55 This could provide economic benefits for many nations along the route, 
and the costs and benefits to those states on an economic level is a source of much debate. 
While India is a cautious rival of China and has not signed on to the BRI, some scholars feel 
India could actually benefit economically if the leadership can overcome their suspicions of 
China, creating a new era of improved economic cooperation and benefit for both 
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countries.56 While China’s strategy does cross with other state’s national interests, there is 
plenty of room for pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes.57 In China’s unique ‘Sino-
capitalism’ system, cooperation with other great powers such as the U.S. may not only be 
beneficial, failure to do so might undercut either state’s economy. In the growing global 
economy, ignoring markets and large opportunities can cause even the greatest economies 
to start to fall behind. While of course state control still exists in China, the hybrid system 
and competition for trade has forced China to make its policies fit within some Western-
style institutions. China has had to adopt some Western values, especially to work through 
the World Trade Organization.58 Huang also believes that “It is important to point out that 
China has no intention of building a parallel international economic system…” and would 
instead prefer to cause, or even lead, reforms of the current system.59 
China has not been entirely satisfied with these Western institutions, however. 
China created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to fund infrastructure 
projects in Asia as an alternative to western controlled development banks such as the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 
particular. The AIIB provides a vehicle for China’s influence and economy, enabling Beijing 
to greenlight projects that benefit its economic interests. The AIIB has gained legitimacy, 
including member states from Europe starting with Great Britain followed by France, 
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Germany, and many others.60 In line with Huang’s comments, China did not withdraw from 
the ADB or other institutions, and branded the AIIB as working together with those other 
organizations instead of being in direct competition. Ultimately, China’s expanding 
economic political interests may pose as much of an opportunity for its neighbors as a 
threat. China’s current five-year plan includes BRI as a major piece, securing energy 
resources needed for China’s domestic economy and infrastructure. Weary of owning 
foreign government debt, China seeks to make better use of its more than 4 trillion foreign 
exchange through direct investment in other states.61 This investment also increases China’s 
influence over those states far more than buying U.S. government bonds does over the 
United States. David Dollar does feel there is some concern that the BRI poses a challenge 
to the world economic order, such as growing indebtedness and a lack of “environmental 
and social safeguards” on the ground. Despite these issues, Dollar feels it is too early to 
make a definitive judgement about the challenging nature of Belt and Road.62 He also feels 
there is optimism in the form of the AIIB and voluntary improvement of standards.  
There is discussion about the economic possibilities for other states in the BRI 
network. BRI would link many markets, including Western Europe, West Africa, Central, 
Eastern, and Southern Asia. There is caution about the successful integration of these 
markets, however, with arbitrary domestic regulations, protectionism, and political 
interference or corruption.63 An optimistic view would be that the economic conditions of 
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64% of the world could be improved. However, as previously discussed, there are concerns 
about how successful Belt and Road can be. Certainly, the success of China’s political goals 
for BRI in Central Asia are tied to its economic success. They may not be directly correlated, 
with some of the political goals viable even if there is only moderate economic success, but 
that level of economic success will have an impact, as well as a limitation, on how much can 
be achieved politically.  
While there is optimism for positive results and success of BRI, there is skepticism on 
China’s ability to achieve that success. Again, most feel it is too early to make any kind of 
prediction. Belt and Road is a high risk, high reward initiative for President Xi. Going beyond 
its previous more bi-lateral trade and direct investment, to make BRI work China will have 
to commit more resources and make itself more vulnerable than in past agreements. 
Leonard Cheng is somewhat optimistic about the potential of BRI, stating that the network 
can “offer benefits to be derived from…specialization and division of labor” but still 
comments that it remains to be seen if BRI will be successful, with many determinants of 
success beyond Beijing’s Control. Cheng continues on to state that a drop in prices of 
certain commodities will make the necessary infrastructure projects more difficult.64 Huang, 
details out the risk factors of Belt and Road, including a lack of an explicit coordination 
mechanism between BRI states, political conflict stemming from a difference in political 
values, and its sustainability.65 Still, Huang feels the initiatives possible benefits for 
undeveloped regions means it should be encouraged. Junhua Zhang believes that while the 
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long term potential of BRI is unclear, the short term gains are not likely to be worth the 
“immense investments” required.66 Looking at the international perspective, Dollar states it 
is unclear how much of a challenge to the global economic order BRI represents but that 
there are concerns about China’s business and economic practices.67 Justin Lin provides 
perhaps the most optimistic viewpoint, stating that BRI if correctly implemented “will 
contributed to a new order and pattern of international peace and development “ leading 
to a “win-win” for all involved.68 But China may not have the resources to commit to, or the 
capability to lead, a successful establishment of the initiative. Du succinctly summarizes this 
point by implying that China’s grandiose vision may be too ambitious for its means.69 
 
Other Discussion 
What is not discussed in the literature is what BRI will mean for individual Central 
Asian nations, or the method and shape of China’s development in Central Asia. 
Infrastructure is a part of the BRI plan and is mentioned, but the effects of that 
development, of other investment, and how China is likely to implement them in individual 
Central Asian states is lacking. These are important aspects to understanding what a post 
BRI Central Asia’s relationship with China will look like, which is in turn critical for 
understanding how China’s attempted new leadership role will change its place in the 
international system. Whether discussed as an economic initiative, a political power play, or 
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a mixture of the two, there is a great deal of skepticism that China’s ambitious goals with 
the Belt and Road Initiative can be fully achieved.  
 
China’s Investment in the Developing World 
 China has sought to achieve global prominence since the end of the era of 
humiliation, to reclaim its place as a great power and equality with its former European 
oppressors. Starting with the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 
1978, China has formalized its global policy through a series of initiatives and slogans, from 
‘inviting the world in’ to ‘go out’ and ‘go global’ steadily increasing China’s international 
involvement.70 Like many powerful states, China’s foreign policy is largely driven by its 
domestic needs. Beijing’s approach to Africa has been driven by an increasing need for raw 
resources to feed its energy and industrial growth.71 China became the world’s largest 
energy importer in 2009, with oil as the greatest need due to low domestic supply and 
policies protecting domestic oil as a reserve against market instability.  The expansion of 
China’s cities and infrastructure added agricultural products, such as soybeans, to this 
industrial need for oil and minerals.72 As David Shambaugh details, China’s industrial boom 
caused a focusing of its policies on the energy resources need to keep the economy running 
and the raw materials to keep it producing, which increased its interest in supplier states in 
regions such as the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia. Recently these 
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regions are also becoming important to the Chinese domestic economy as potential 
markets for exporting and investment, with growth in these areas coinciding with increases 
in diplomatic interaction, such as official state visits and cooperative agreements.73 China’s 
domestic economic needs shape its interest in the developing world leading it to focus on 
states where it can obtain specific resources, such as oil, at favorable terms.  
 An examination of China’s initial relationship with poorer states in developing 
regions demonstrates this pattern. States such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Columbia, and the Congo all possess oil reserves which attracted China. Similarly, 
China has been attracted to states with large mineral reserves such as Chile, Peru, and 
South Africa. China began developing greater trade and investment relationships with these 
states during its ‘go global’ period in the 1990s and into the early 2000s.  
 After China’s initial interest, the recipient state’s domestic conditions affect China’s 
goals in that specific state. China’s own domestic economic struggles, combined with its 
increasing need for oil, is the initial driving force which then manifests based on the 
recipient state’s domestic conditions.  Where China feels it can create markets and 
opportunity for Chinese firms, it will go beyond just its energy interests. When instability or 
lack of diversity cause a weakness or vulnerability to the economy, China will often remain 
focused on resource extraction. Examining China’s relationship with several developing 
states demonstrates this pattern of behavior.  
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Nigeria 
In the case of Nigeria, oil attracted China’s interest initially, expanding to other 
industries later. China’s trade with Nigeria climbed from $178 million in 1996 to $570 
million in 1999, and then over a billion in 2001.74 In 1995, Nigeria reduced restrictions on 
foreign ownership of Nigerian companies, with as much as 100% ownership allowed in non-
oil industries.75 Even with the restrictions on oil company ownership, China’s companies 
have purchased stakes in Nigerian companies in addition to directly importing oil from 
Nigeria.76 While Nigeria has attracted trading partners all over the world, especially in 
Europe and North America, no region’s increase in FDI compares to increase of Chinese FDI 
into Nigeria.77 While not as isolated as other states, Nigeria still provided China an 
opportunity for oil and trade without prohibitive competition.  
 
Venezuela 
Initial interest in Venezuela began in the late 1990s, resulting in China National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC) securing rights to develop Venezuela’s oil assets for export 
back to China. By 2008 Venezuela was exporting 450,000 barrels a day.78 Venezuela was 
unhappy with its primary trading partner in the United States and Western regimes, making 
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China and its philosophy non-interreference very appealing.79 Conversely, the instability of 
the government under Hugo Chavez made Venezuela unappealing to many wealthy 
countries, further limiting its options for trading partners. 80 As part of its agreements and 
investment terms with its new great power patron, new infrastructure for Venezuela’s oil 
industry will largely be purchased from China or built by Chinese firms, with limited ability 
for competition for contracts.81 This follows the pattern of China exploiting an energy 
resource developing country with limited great power trading partners.  
 
Sudan 
China’s relationship with Sudan82 began in a similar fashion. In 1997 Sudan had 
severely limited options for foreign investors while its debt had climbed to 250 percent of 
its GDP, resulting in interest payments of $4.5 million per day.83 Beijing seized on the 
opportunity to fill this void of economic partners. Interested in Sudan’s oil and happy to 
provide economic support without the humanitarian requirements that had made it difficult 
for Khartoum to deal with the IMF or World Bank, China made a complementary match for 
Sudan. China would provide the investment, expertise, and construction capacity while 
Sudan’s untapped oil reserves held great potential, especially under the favorable terms 
China would surely obtain. Many infrastructure projects to develop Sudan’s capacity to 
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export oil back to China were granted to Chinese firms, materials and labor.84  China’s CNPC 
purchased 40% of Sudan’s largest oil firm, Greater Nile Petroleum.85 Another example of the 
favorable terms for China is the exemption from restrictions and taxation on oil exported to 
China.86 Sudan’s weak economic position, lack of trading partners, and possession of large 
oil reserves combined to create a perfect package for China, resulting in the actions 
modeled by this work.   
 
Ecuador 
Ecuador found itself in a similar situation with a failing economy and defaulting on 
its international loans in 2008.87 Again attracted by oil reserves, China found an opportunity 
in Ecuador’s economic isolation. Beijing stepped in and secured Ecuador’s oil exports, 
offering an initial $1 billion loan to Ecuadorean oil companies in 2007.88  The Chinese 
government was willing to invest when most of the world was not, a situation the Chinese 
government used for its own benefit once again. Ecuador’s isolated position, weak 
economy, and oil focused exports provided China with the opportunity to set favorable 
terms for itself, securing both another oil source and a market for Chinese exporters.  
Infrastructure projects, following the pattern, soon materialized with an emphasis on 
Chinese firms and labor. These projects revolved primarily around shipping, with the 
development of the Manta port and airport as the two main projects, to facilitate the flow 
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of oil and Chinese exports. Beijing also purchased existing oil infrastructure with a Chinese 
consortium buying Ecuador’s holdings in EnCana, giving it control over multiple oilfields and 
the better of Ecuador’s two oil pipelines.89 Favorable terms for China required Ecuador to 
meet export quotas at lower than market prices, creating another cost-effective source of 
oil for China’s growing domestic needs.  
 
Angola 
Angola is another oil economy that attracted China’s interest, becoming one of the 
its biggest trading partners in Africa almost solely from oil imports. Angola’s oil boom had 
attracted many investors, but its government policies caused problems. In 2004 Angola was 
dealing with a war-torn infrastructure and increased scrutiny from the IMF, which 
demanded more transparency on the oil revenues resulting from its loans, causing Angola 
to end its relationship with the IMF completely.90 Angola then possessed the conditions 
most desirable by Beijing: a developing economy, a poor relationship with Western 
institutions, booming oil economy, and as an added bonus, in need of infrastructure 
development. China has opposed the government that won the Angolan civil war leading to 
cooled relations prior to 2004, but after breaking ties with the IMF China became a 
dominant trading partner. China offered Angola a $2 billion line of credit, which could be 
paid back with oil. The price of the oil would be fixed at market price, Angola could not set 
its own, and the line of credit was to be used for infrastructure projects, which then went to 
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Chinese firms. It is notable that at the same time India had put in an offer to purchase 
Shell’s oil share in Angola which included $200 million for infrastructure projects. Instead, 
Angola matched the offer and then sold it in a consortium owned 75% by Sinopec.91 Even if 
there was not a direct agreement between China and Angola regarding the line of credit 
and Shell oil shares, China’s backing certainly played a role in Angola’s confidence to match 
the bid. In 2010, Angola was China’s second largest oil importer by volume.92 China has 
remained dominant in its relationship with Angola. In 2006 when Angola lobbied for a new 
refinery, China refused because Angola would not agree to sell a majority of the refined 
product in China instead of Africa.93 Angola provides another clear example of China 
controlling and shaping its trade relationships with developing oil-based economies to meet 
its own interests. By including oil repayment options, ensuring the development contracts 
go to Chinese firms, and only investing when it was confident the profit would come back 
home, China demonstrates its standard model of behavior and indicates its goals for this 
kind of investment. China was not after the interest on the line of credit it granted Angola, 
but rather the crude oil imports and infrastructure projects, simultaneously feeding its need 
for more energy resources and providing a market for Chinese companies.  
 
Morocco and Chile 
From these numerous examples the previously described pattern becomes clear. 
Specific material resources, usually oil, capture China’s initial interest. Morocco, falling 
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below Nigeria and Angola but above Sudan in GDP for the region failed to attract the 
attention that these other states received from China. One reason for this is that Morocco 
does not possess significant oil reserves or any other material resource that China needs. 
Morocco also has close ties with France and Europe, which is another determining factor in 
China’s behavior. Established ties with other rich nations as economic partners strengthens 
the recipient state’s bargaining position, making it less appealing to Chinese leadership. 
Similarly, Chile possesses mineral resources that China needs and does export them to 
China. However, Chile has not been a significant recipient of Chinese investment and 
development.94 China did attempt to employ the strategies seen in the examples above, but 
Chile had the ability to resist some of China’s more one-sided practices while positioning 
itself as a potential “commercial nexus” between China, the United States, and South 
America.95  With these factors in place, China negotiates favorable terms for securing rights 
to the desired resource, and offers its own firms, materials, labor, and expertise in 
developing the infrastructure needed to more effectively export the resource back to China. 
In addition to obtaining the desired resource, China is creating opportunities for its 
domestic firms through these infrastructure projects, and potentially investment 
opportunities for them as we saw Chinese firms often purchase stakes in local companies. 
The health and diversity of the economy will affect how much China will invest in these 
additional opportunities.  
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Evolution of Chinese Investment 
 Sudan’s economy was struggling as the country dealt with civil strife and corruption, 
with its economy extremely depending on oil.  Under these conditions China focused on just 
importing oil, with the only other significant trade being arms sales. China began selling 
weapons, ranging from automatic rifles to full size weapon systems such as fighter jets, to 
Sudan in the 1980s.96 While arms sales to African countries was not unusual, China’s 
interest in the oilfields that were in the conflict zone suggest it’s motives were still focused 
on oil. Ian Taylor states “The motivations for such supplies is simple. Apart from the profits 
from these arms sales, the policy helps consolidate and protect Chinese shares in the 
exploitation of Sudan’s oil reserves” which is further evidenced by the allowance of 
Sudanese government forces to use Chinese owned facilities as bases of operations in 
suppressing the south.97  This undermines China’s claim to a non-interventionist foreign 
policy. Because of domestic conditions in the Sudan, Beijing focused on the resource 
extraction goal, eschewing investment in Sudanese businesses, unrelated infrastructure 
projects, immigration of Chinese citizens to the Sudan, and other methods employed 
elsewhere in Africa. 
In the case of Nigeria, there is a stark contrast in behavior as well as importance to 
China. Ndubisi Obiorah, Darren Kew, and Yusef Tanko label Nigeria the “sociopolitical giant” 
that serves as an important case for China’s relationship with the continent. Obiorah et al. 
go on to state that Nigeria “…should have a leading role in shaping China’s involvement…” 
                                                 
96 Rotberg, China into Africa, 163 
97 Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy,” 949,950 
38 
 
and that “Nigeria’s relative wealth and complexity should give it greater leverage than 
smaller African countries.”98 Nigeria’s relative diverse economy and internal stability 
encourage China to go beyond just oil agreements. China has invested in various other 
sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and communications.99 China invests in Nigeria 
through loans, importing goods, investing in development projects, and through the private 
sector. Many non-oil industry Chinese companies, both state owned and otherwise, export 
to Nigeria or have also purchased significant ownership stakes in Nigerian companies. China 
also has expanded its imports to include agricultural and manufacturing products. Following 
past domestic strategies, China worked with Nigeria to create special economic zones. In 
these areas, China could leverage its resources and expertise to secure large development 
contracts, especially for infrastructure. These infrastructure projects range from 
transportation like railroads, bridges, and airports to government with administration 
headquarters, communications projects like launching Nigeria’s first telecommunications 
satellite in 2007, to recreational projects with the Abuja Sports Complex.100 Ports are not 
ignored, as China owns 49% of Tin Can Island Warf, the main port of Lagos.101  
In addition to trade agreements and economic zones, the two countries also signed 
agreements on the sincere friendship and mutual trust in symbolic political gestures. There 
are growing pedagogical and cultural links between China and Nigeria. China supplied 
Nigeria with other forms of aid, such as anti-malaria medicine, training of medical 
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personnel, and materials to combat avian flu. Generally, Nigerian media has displayed a 
positive view of China and praised the economic growth they generate and the hands-off 
political stance they take. However, there has also been some resentment against China for 
losses in Nigeria’s domestic manufacturing and textile sectors, and the focus on Chinese 
labor over locals. China has responded to Nigerian complaints, such as initiating 
telecommunications after a lack of technological and human resource development was 
communicated from Lagos to Beijing.102 China’s more broad development of Nigeria and a 
willingness to respond to complaints demonstrates how the different domestic conditions 
in Nigeria have led to different behavior from China. China remained focused on resource 
extraction and infrastructure projects using Chinese firms, materials, and labor; however, 
the relative diversity and stability mentioned earlier provided the opportunity to grow new 
markets for Chinese companies. This helped China address its domestic economic 
concerns.  Nigeria provides an interesting blueprint for Chinese behavior in a developing 
state with these more beneficial domestic conditions.  
China’s relationship with Ecuador has remained centered around oil, with 
infrastructure projects focused on shipping with an airport and sea port as the two main 
projects. Through loans from various China’s companies, some of which were secured with 
oil, Ecuador’s government was able to improve its economy and make payments on its 
loans from China, leading to its credit rating being restored in 2012.103 With these improved 
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conditions, China could further its goals for its domestic economy, selling billions of dollars’ 
worth of low-end textiles, footwear, and toys to Ecuador.104 Ecuador’s economic growth 
may not continue, however, as lower oil prices may be slowing the economy. In 2017, the 
Ecuadorean government sought to renegotiate with China, specifically wanting to 
restructure loans, change the amount of oil they are required to sell to China, and the price 
at which they sell the oil.105 The current terms limit Ecuador’s options, as China has a near 
monopoly on Ecuador’s oil exports, giving it significant leverage on Ecuador’s economy. 
China has controlled the relationship, with most of the development projects have using 
Chinese companies, materials and workers.106 Ecuador’s stability and improved credit rating 
are certainly ways it has benefited from Beijing’s patronage, but now it is facing the 
sometimes stifling cost of that relationship.  
China’s relationship with Venezuela has not proven as successful. China continued to 
develop Venezuelan oil export capacity through refineries, railroads, oil platforms, and 
other supporting infrastructure while Chinese oil companies obtained direct licensees to 
drill in Venezuela.107 China also extracted mineral resources, benefiting from the weaker 
position of Venezuela and negotiating a seven-year contract in 2009 at prices far below 
market value.108 As Venezuela’s economy destabilized, China was forced out of necessity to 
take steps to protect its interests and artificially support the Venezuelan economy. Prior to 
2009, infrastructure and other projects outside of energy resources had been fewer 
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compared to China’s other trade partners in the region.109 After 2009, China’s development 
began to expand beyond just oil and mineral mining projects in small ways, which then 
evolved into larger measures to keep the Venezuelan economy from total collapse. China 
contributed to agriculture through irrigation projects, transportation through wider ranging 
infrastructure projects, and communications through a joint satellite launch.110 Yet, 
Venezuela’s economic decline continued, increasing drastically in 2014 after a drop in oil 
prices. Venezuela renegotiated terms on its loans-for-oil deals, but inflation continued to 
rise, so China allowed $4 billion in development loans to instead be used for Venezuela’s 
foreign exchange reserve.111 While China has previously been able to minimize risk and 
avoid serious loss when dealing with unstable developing states, Venezuela may provide a 
lesson for Beijing. Through its loans, China tied itself to Venezuela’s economic crisis. 
Between 2007 and 2015, Venezuela’s loans accounted for 53% of China’s lending for the 
region, making China vulnerable should Venezuela default, and causing China to be more 
cautious in dealing with similar states in the BRI network. 112 China seems willing to go the 
distance with Venezuela rather than cut its losses. For the future, Beijing seems to be 
changing the focus of its loans in South America, lending more in industries outside oil, 
having greater considerations for how countries’ economies are run before lending, and 
pulling back where it can from Venezuela.113 Currently, Venezuela is still in a downward 
economic spiral and it remains to be seen if China will recover its investments there. 
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Additionally, unlike in Central Asia, Beijing’s possibilities for direct intervention into 
Venezuela are limited both by distance and potential conflicts with the United States.  
China’s behavior in the developing world follows an identifiable pattern across 
multiple regions. Beijing’s actions depend on how domestic conditions affect its pursuit of 
its goals. China’s actions through Venezuela’s economic crisis and the Sudanese civil war 
also provide interesting examples of how Beijing faces different adverse conditions in 
recipient states. As China’s interests abroad grow, so will the need for it to involve itself in 
foreign affairs to maintain stability and protect its interests, putting it into positions where 
has criticized the U.S. for being in the past.  
 
China’s Soft Power Challenges 
 Chinese leadership holds soft power as an important aspect of a Great Power, and 
actively works to create soft power influence and improve China’s image globally .114 The 
desire for soft power is evident from direct references in several CCP documents and 
speeches, most notably by President Xi Jinping himself in 2014 when he called for an 
increase in soft power to present China and its message to the world.115 Elizabeth Economy 
describes President Xi’s ambitions as “a stated and demonstrated desire to shape the 
international system, to use China’s power to influence others…only the United States has 
the range of economic and military tools matched with global political aspirations that 
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China now displays.”116 While BRI is primarily economic, it is important to understand how it 
relates to President Xi’s soft power goals and where it does not.  
 Soft power causes other states to want the same things that you want without 
coercion.  This work especially focuses on those with the political power to affect state 
policy. In most of the states developed by China, the general population does not have 
much political power, if any. To evaluate if China is achieving its soft power goals for the BRI 
we must know if that target state’s leadership is adopting uniquely Chinese political views, 
institutions, and standards. Soft power is different from military or economic power in the 
lack of a ‘loss’ if the second state does not cooperate. Soft power is ‘highly normative’ in 
nature and relies upon cooperation instead of coercion, with David Shambaugh likening it to 
“magnet that pulls and draws others…because of its powerful appeal by example.”117 Soft 
power is useful in exporting your own systems and attaining international recognition and 
support as a great power. The risk of a military reprisal or losing economic gains in conflicts 
or trade negotiations distinguishes those situations from the use of soft power. An example 
of soft power would be the adoption of norms through cultural or ideological diffusions 
between states. In other words, the ‘stick’ is lacking to use the ‘carrot and stick’ metaphor. 
Even the carrot must be provided by the state’s choice to adopt the norm, not a direct boon 
granted by the influencing state. To compare to categories established by Amitai Etzioni, 
soft power would be considered ‘identitive’ power.118 Soft power requires a willing change 
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in the perception of the influenced states priorities and values through information, ideas, 
and culture, resulting in one state convincing another state their interests are aligned, 
resulting in the desired action. 
 How does China’s BRI fit into its soft power goals? First it should be understood that 
the primary economic purpose of the network, facilitating trade and the flow of energy 
resources, is not a soft power goal, because of the material incentive provided by dealing 
with China and being a BRI state. Soft power is also very difficult leverage for a single 
specific goal, instead being effective for greater shifts in norms and fundamental ideology 
over time. These factors greatly limit how much of BRI is soft power, and how successful BRI 
will be in contributing to China’s desire for more soft power. Chinese soft power discussions 
within China fall within three camps, culture, politics, and economic development.119 Each 
of these camps considers China to lack significant soft power. Belt and Road is an economic 
and political initiative that can become a distribution channel for China’s culture, especially 
its business culture, as well. Michael Du lists the action plan items for BRI as Policy 
Coordination, Facility Connectivity, Unimpeded Trade, Financial Integration, and People to 
People Bond. These action plan items provide context for its focus and how it fits into each 
of these three aspects.120 Of course, Belt and Road’s infrastructure development fits into 
economic development, and there is a clear geopolitical aspect as well. But, with each of 
these tied to material incentives, they are more coercive than purely cooperative. There are 
a few aspects of Policy Coordination that could contribute to identitive gains. To Chinese 
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audiences the naming and promotion of the BRI project, with terms such as “Silk Road 
Economic Belt” and “Twenty First Century Maritime Silk Road,” evoke a Chinese identity 
and culture, especially when linked with creating an “Asia-Pacific dream” or the “New China 
Dream” concepts pushed by President Xi. The increased presence of China in Central Asia 
will also provide an increase in opportunities to spread Chinese propaganda.121 Also under 
Policy Coordination would be the exporting of Chinese industry standards, which is not 
directly a soft power gain. However, if states within the BRI network begin using Chinese 
industrial standards, this provides a foothold for other policy emulation and can be the 
beginning of more influential soft power growth for China, similar to the adoption of English 
as the universal language of air traffic control. A commonly held view in China is that ‘first 
tier companies’ make standards instead of products, and Beijing is focused on exporting its 
own technological standards through BRI, becoming a leader in innovation.122  
The greatest opportunity for soft power gains through Belt and Road comes from 
the People to People Bond, designed to build the critical business relationships. This would 
be emphasized by the cultural soft power camp. These business relationships may not have 
the direct purpose of cultural exchange, but a vast network of interpersonal relationships 
could be a vehicle for such. Personal relations between key figures in China’s SOEs and local 
businesses, government officials, and community leaders will facilitate the operation of the 
BRI network at the hubs and local levels. Individual interactions between businesses or local 
government officials is where the concepts and high-level agreements become operational 
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on the ground in BRI states. Because of their importance to BRI and the fact that these will 
be influential people interacting, this area is where culture, norms, and methods can be 
adopted and eventually influence policy and behavior in the host state. This could be a 
result of establishing Belt and Road but is not a direct result. If any significant gains in soft 
power are to be made through the BRI, it will be borne out these relationships.  
Improving its soft power and its image has proven challenging for China. Despite the 
eagerness of developing states (especially ones with authoritarian governments) to accept 
Chinese investment and trade, they have been slow to adopt Chinese political ideology and 
cultural norms. For more liberal states, China’s political oppression and humanitarian rights 
undermine its message, and for more authoritarian states, China’s government model is too 
decentralized and ‘power-sharing’ to be very appealing. Additionally, the Western liberal 
norms of the United States and Europe are favored in the international stage, causing many 
states to want to at least appear to be adopting them in order to be offered more inclusion 
in international affairs. State media efforts to promote Chinese culture and export it to 
other states is ineffective in gaining soft power because China lacks a free press to present 
opposing viewpoints which in turn significantly hurts their credibility. Joseph Nye, discussing 
how the United States might gain soft power in developing countries, warned that using 
propaganda would undermine credibility and “squander” soft power, not create it.123 
Talking about China specifically, Wanning Sun explains that Beijing’s fast track attempts to 
gain soft power, especially when it uses coercive methods, actually undermines their 
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efforts, limiting their soft power instead of enhancing it.124 In step with these views, David 
Shambaugh states that, “China fails to understand that despite its world-class culture…and 
despite its extraordinary economic rise…as long as its political system denies, rather than 
enables, free human development, its propaganda efforts will face an uphill battle.”125 
Beijing has invested a large amount of resources into its international soft power efforts 
with very little in the way of results. In particular, China has failed to make significant 
popularity gains in the the regions of Africa and Latin America.126  
China’s BRI may prove to strengthen its influence abroad and provide a mechanism 
for the spread its culture and ideals. The network of governments and businesses created 
through the Belt and Road Initiative could become a platform to create soft power 
influence, but BRI is not likely to generate any direct significant soft power gains. Because 
this soft power initiative is likely to fail, China will likely have to turn to other forms of 
financial incentives or coercion to maintain its power and influence across Central Asia.  
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CHAPTER 3. MODEL OF CHINESE BEHAVIOR IN DEVELOPING STATES 
 
The previous chapter reveals China’s strategy for developing poorer states. As a 
majority of countries that will be involved in Belt and Road are developing countries, and 
certainly that is the case with Central Asia, this strategy is likely to be employed again. This 
is already evident in the focus of BRI on infrastructure development and energy resources. 
There may be subtle changes in the approach: President Xi may be less cautious than China 
has been in past development, the goals are defined within the structure of the Belt and 
Road Initiative, and China may apply lessons learned from past situations like Venezuela. 
Overall however, China will continue to employ these methods in establishing BRI in Central 
Asia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Relative health and diversity of economies  
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Policy Model 
The existing conditions in the state will determine the strategies China will employ. 
As previously established, this work focused on four specific conditions as most impactful 
on Chinese behavior. First, does the state has a specific resource that draws China’s 
attention and drives its relationship with the state? This is almost always a prerequisite for a 
developing nation to see greater than average investment and development from China. 
Second is the strength of the state’s economy; weaker states are more likely to be 
dependent on China. Third is the diversity of the state’s economy. Countries with less 
diversified economies have a weaker position vis-à-vis China. The fourth aspect is the 
availability of other wealthy states for investment and trade. If China has peer competitors 
vying for the favor of a target country, Beijing will likely have to offer more concessions 
creating a less unequal arrangement. In the end, target developing nations come to China’s 
attention because they meet a domestic need for China. Meeting a specific need and a lack 
of strong great power competition are sufficient requirements for Chinese involvement in a 
developing state.  Once invested the resulting behavior depends on the stability and 
diversity of the economy. How different states, including two examples of when China did 
not invest, differ from each other in these two factors is displayed in Figure 2. The diversity 
and health of the recipient state economy then determines the specific ways China invests.  
China’s foreign policy is increasingly entangled with its domestic interests, not only 
because of the need to continue economic growth, but also to maintain support for the CCP 
and the Chinese military.127 As such, China’s approach to the developing world must be 
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considered in context of these domestic interests. In most cases this interest will be for 
energy resources, usually oil. In the case of Tajikistan detailed later in this work I will also 
suggest another ‘resource’ for China besides oil that would cause the same behavioral 
pattern. Driven by this specific need, China will pursue an economic relationship with the 
state to secure its goals. While offering this investment or trade will provide some benefit 
for the other state, China will behave as any great power and try to maximize its own 
benefit. In China’s case, the next steps depend on the existing conditions within the state.  
With a healthy economy, especially one that is diverse, then the recipient state has a 
stronger bargaining position to demand more out of economic deals. China may invest 
more in developing that economy as a market for Chinese exports instead of just focusing 
on buying up the desired resource. Beijing will usually focus on manufacturing, 
communications, and textile industries. This will also create investment opportunities for 
Chinese companies, who can build facilities locally in the partner state or purchase large 
portions of local companies. An unhealthy economy combined with being excluded from 
most of the international economic order causes a state to be appealing to China because of 
the favorable terms Beijing can set. China’s willingness to invest when others are not, the 
amount of energy resources it is willing to buy, and the lack of certain requirements, such as 
government or humanitarian reforms, make China initially appealing to the partner state as 
well, especially in authoritarian regimes which need money to continue their rule. 
Government type does not affect the other direction, however, as China seems just as 
willing to invest in more democratic regimes as autocratic ones. With a weaker state, China 
will focus on its primary need, usually energy resources, with any infrastructure 
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development facilitating that goal. It will be a smaller percentage of China’s overall 
economic relationship with that state, with the focus on resource extraction. If the resource 
based economy is still healthy, China will invest in more additional projects than unhealthy 
resource economies. However, this development will not be spread over as many different 
industries as in a diverse healthy economy. China’s strategy furthers its foreign policy goals, 
expanding their influence and creating an alternative to western powers while also 
benefitting China’s domestic economy. Whether or not this is the primary goal in every case 
is unclear, but a complete explanation of China’s behavior in the developing world must 
include the story of China upholding its domestic growth.  
 
Measuring China’s Political Gains Through UN Voting 
To empirically explore the relationship between Chinese economic influence and any 
political or soft power gains, I will examine the UN voting behavior of China and states in 
the developing world who either trade or have received significant investment from China. 
This will provide evidence either for or against the Chinese strategy of gaining political 
influence and soft power through economic incentives. Many political science scholars are 
using UN voting behavior as one method to measure political affinity which is difficult to 
quantify.128 While UN voting does not provide a complete picture, it is a useful tool to help 
evaluate dyadic relationships. This data is not conclusive enough on its own to prove a 
causal relationship, but it will establish if there is evidence of a connection between 
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economic relationships and political affinity.  Specifically, by testing UN votes against 
China’s FDI with developing states we will see if that economic relationship carries over into 
the political sphere, which is one specific goal of the BRI. I am using a standard linear 
regression model (OLS) to test the relationship between state’s dyadic UN voting with China 
and Foreign Direct Investment from China. This data is pulled from OECD FDI and ODI 
figures and the 2009 Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey United Nations General Assembly Voting 
Data.129 
Table 1. Regression of UN Voting Similarity and FDI investment by China 
 UN Vote Similarity P Value  Difference in Ideal Scores P Value  
Log of FDI 0.00368 0.10173 -0.0411** 0.00261 
Log of Development -0.00273** 0.00342 0.0445*** 4.17 e14 
Africa 0.0196*** 0.00012 -0.125*** 5.00 e06 
South America -0.00212 0.733 0.0279 0.465 
R2 .0939  .0246  
 
The results of the test do suggest that, in general, states with a lower development 
level vote with China more often. However, the significant negative relationship of FDI 
suggests that recipient states vote differently than China, which is also evident in the 
negative score for Africa. The political goals for China’s economic initiatives, like the BRI, will 
be less likely to succeed. These results do not support the idea that China can make long 
term political and soft power gains through economic investment and trade. This supports 
the current views and research on China’s soft power limitations. China’s politics and 
economics make it a lucrative and appealing alternative to investment from western great 
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powers, but the strength and longevity of that relationship in the political sphere is 
questionable. These developing states may be just as likely to side against China’s foreign 
policy initiatives, especially if they are given similar economic incentives by other great 
powers. 
 
Discussion 
 Despite its claims of non-interference, China has taken some actions to intervened 
to protect its interests in a state. While it China may differ in many ways from most great 
power countries investing the developing world, every investor desires a stable 
environment for their investment. To this end China will support local governments, 
interfering by some definitions, to maintain stability regardless of the nature of that 
stability. This has been done through indirect means, selling arms and providing support to 
the local government to create stability, or fostering talks and agreements between parties. 
As China’s international profile grows, this could be one area they will have to change. For 
example, China faced a considerable amount of criticism over its arms sales to Sudan during 
the civil conflict there. China may be forced not only to intervene more directly and more 
often, but it may have to carefully consider its methods in the future. These considerations 
help refine the potential outcomes and variations that may occur in China’s future actions 
within the pattern of behavior established in this analysis. All together Overall, this creates a 
framework of Chinese behavior in developing states that can be applied to how China will 
pursue its goals in the future. Here, I will apply this framework to Central Asia and two 
important states there for the Belt and Road Initiative, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.  
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CHAPTER 4. BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 
This work has examined how China’s behavior overseas is determined by domestic 
conditions in recipient countries. In the case of Central Asia, China’s desire for the Belt and 
Road to be successful is just as strong a driving force. Belt and Road will help secure and 
feed energy resources back to China, as well as meet other critical needs, such as new 
markets for domestic economic growth. Central Asian states with energy resources, 
primarily Kazakhstan, will seek to capitalize on that role through the BRI for greater gain. 
Other roles will be equally important, such as hosting a ‘hub city’ which will be a node in the 
network. Trade through the SREB, communications facilitating the SREB, and important 
administration of Belt and Road will take place in these hub cities, making them critical to 
the greater structure of the BRI network. Central Asia’s importance to China and the 
international system will greatly increase with the implementation of the Belt and Road 
Initiative.  
While China has had a presence in Central Asia for most of history, it has not always 
been an active or dominant player. The United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia have 
all been great powers that have vied for influence in Central Asia.  The contest between 
Russia and Britain in the nineteenth century was later dubbed the ‘Great Game’ in which 
Britain sought to defend its interests in India against Russian Empire’s growing influence in 
the region. The two empires employed various strategies to gain control over parts of 
Central Asia, either directly or by coercing local leaders. This battle of influence helped 
create the “modern study of geopolitics” with Central Asia in particular becoming “…an 
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arena of high-stakes geopolitical sparring” as stated by Alexander Cooley.130 While China 
attempted to protect its interests during these periods, it was not challenging these other 
great powers for a leading position. Conditions in Central Asia are not entirely a matter of 
foreign policy for Beijing, as the region has very close ties with China’s western Xinjiang 
region.131 China’s approach to Central Asia cannot be divorced from Xinjiang province.  
Stability in Xinjiang is a consideration for any policy towards Central Asia, as the region has 
been problematic for Beijing with issues of economic and societal inequality between 
different ethnic groups and Han Chinese.132 China’s economic policies in Central Asia, 
including the Belt Road, serve a purpose in Xinjiang. Beijing believes economic policies can 
help reduce ethnic unrest and stabilize the province while contributing to regional 
security.133 While content to more passively protect its interests in Central Asian in the past, 
recently China has begun asserting itself more aggressively, especially under President Xi 
Jinping.  
Certainly, Beijing is pursuing a more dominant role in Central Asia. Since the fall of 
the Soviet Union, China has been becoming more active in the region, seeing it as critical for 
both security and energy resources.134 China established the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization which most Central Asian states became members off, as well as investing 
over $48 billion in infrastructure and energy resource development.135 China surpassed 
                                                 
130Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, (New York: Oxford University Press 2012), 15-16 
131 Xinjiang is a large autonomous region in northwest China that borders central Asia and has several ethnic 
minority groups, including the Muslim Uyghurs. 
132Valerie Niquet, “China and Central Asia,” China Perspectives, (2006), 3 
133 Rachel Brown, “Where will the new silk road lead?” Columbia University Journal of Politics & Society, 
(2015), 86 
134 Fallon, “Grand Strategy,” 144 
135 Fasslabend, “The Silk Road,” 299 
56 
 
Russia as Central Asia’s largest trading partner in the 2000s.136 These efforts, prior to 
President Xi’s tenure, were described by Colley as China redrawing the fences in Russia’s 
backyard.137 Now BRI could be the next step in cooperation with Central Asia expanding on 
these past efforts. Beijing hopes that Belt and Road will address the economic equality as 
Xinjiang will see the lion’s share of an increase in trade with Central Asia. Xinjiang may also 
benefit from new markets made available through Belt and Road, allowing it to increase its 
exports.138 Economic gains, through new markets and energy resources, are both goal for 
Beijing and an opportunity it offers to the Central Asian states. Through BRI 
underdeveloped regions, such as Central Asia, could gain success in the world economy, 
increase their living standards, and become important parts of the global supply chain.139 
Belt and Road, despite the possibility of popular opposition and dissent, has been welcomed 
by Central Asian leaders.140 However, the general populace in China has often met Chinese 
investing firms with “popular suspicion and xenophobia.”141 Belt and Road also contributes 
to security concerns in Central Asia, helping China assume a more active role in light of the 
receding presence of the United States, and also with Russia being focused on Ukraine.142 If 
China has previously been moving the fence, then President Xi is planning on tearing down 
it down completely and building new landscaping, all while claiming the yard is a shared co-
op. It remains to be seen how much true cooperation will happen between the ‘friendly’ 
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neighbors of Russia and China. How Belt and Road may manifest in Central Asia can be 
explored through the examples of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan below.  
 
Kazakhstan 
 Kazakhstan is a dominant state in the region of Central Asia, combining large 
geographic size, the most resources, and the most powerful economy. Kazakhstan also 
shares significant borders both Russia and China. Kazakhstan’s GDP of $133 billion (USD) 
eclipses the combined GDP of the other four Central Asian states, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan & Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan’s natural resources includes valuable mineral deposits, 
arable land for agriculture, and large oil and natural gas reserves which had already 
previously caught the interest of China.143 Kazakhstan is a petro-dictatorship, relying on oil 
revenues to keep in power President Nursultan Nazarbayev, its sole leader since 
independence. President Nazarbayev is routinely ‘re-elected’ in landslide elections with 
extremely high voter turnout, most recently winning with 97.7% of the vote, indicating the 
election is highly suspect.144 Kazakhstan’s economy includes Soviet-style state owned 
enterprises, similar to China’s structure, up until 2015 when some privatization and reform 
was started. Kazakhstan had continued the Soviet structure of government business 
ownership with a minimal private sector.145 The government has remained relatively stable, 
with power consolidated under President Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan’s economy only recently 
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started experiencing significant growth in 2000.146 Kazakhstan has already been working 
with China and other states, building oil pipelines and developing its energy resources for 
export. Kazakhstan has oil and natural gas that have already drawn in the interest of China, 
and the role of its infrastructure in BRI reinforce that interest. Kazakhstan has a strong and 
stable economy driven by its energy resources, largely oil and natural gas but also includes 
uranium. Its recent trend of privatization and policies meant to innovate a more diverse 
economy may help it avoid the weaknesses of other oil-based economies, such as Ecuador, 
Venezuela, and Sudan. This greater stability may make conditions in Kazakhstan closer to 
those of Nigeria, giving Kazakhstan a stronger bargaining position despite the energy 
resource focus of its economy. Kazakhstan does have some options among wealthy states 
as trade partners and receives investment from western states such as the United States 
and the Netherlands and institutions such as the European Investment Bank. However, 
China is already Kazakhstan’s dominant trading partner and President Nazarbayev’s 
government has a strong relationship with China. Since 1997 Kazakhstan played a critical 
role in supplying oil for China’s increasing domestic consumption, which grew into a political 
strategic partnership in 2005.147 In 2015, China signed a series of thirty three deals valued at 
$23.6 billion with Kazakhstan, furthering cooperation and ties that will contribute to Belt 
and Road.148 This commitment to cooperative development and trade with Kazakhstan are 
already making the Sino-Kazakh relationship a priority.  
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China’s goals with Kazakhstan for BRI will remain centered around oil production and 
the facilitation of oil from other states funneled to China through Kazakhstan’s pipelines, 
although other areas of cooperation and networking may become more important than 
before. Oil and energy resources are still what China needs most from Kazakhstan. A 
supplemental goal could be gaining greater influence and political support in relation to 
Russia from Kazakhstan. This fits into China’s greater desire for energy security and 
dominance in the region. Given these goals, China has invested and built infrastructure, 
such as pipelines, and will continue to do so. BRI may help facilitate this strategy but it does 
not change it. Given the existing conditions in Kazakhstan, the government in Astana will 
have a relatively stronger bargaining position than other states in the region. This will result 
in more favorable terms for these new development projects and trade agreements as 
China creates what it needs for the Belt and Road Initiative. As Kazakhstan’s economy 
improves in stability and diversity, China will likely take notice and invest in developing the 
Kazakhstan local markets for Chinese goods. Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev will 
welcome this investment, as it continues to provide a strong market for exports as well as 
increasing Kazakhstan’s capacity to send these resources to other states. Following past 
patterns, President Nazarbayev will likely use increasing revenues to bolster his government 
and the ruling elite of Kazakhstan. Negative impacts on some domestic sectors or regions 
from Chinese development projects are unlikely to impact his decision making. These 
factors make China’s current successful economic and political relationship with Kazakhstan 
likely to continue. Because of presence of other trading partners, and the relative strength 
of the Kazakh economy, there is potential for Kazakhstan to successfully push for better 
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terms with China, especially to keep it from seeking patronage with other great powers, 
specifically Russia.  
 
Tajikistan 
Tajikistan is the smallest of the Central Asian states in total area, though not in 
population. It has one of the lowest GDPs at just under 7 billion (USD). Tajikistan’s economy 
is heavily dependent on remittances from workers in Russia.149 Other than these 
remittances, Tajikistan’s economy is based on agricultural exports. Tajikistan is an 
authoritarian government led by President Emomali Rahmon. President Rahmon has been a 
powerful political figure since Tajikistan’s independence in 1991, ascending to the 
presidency in 1994. Tajikistan experienced a period of civil war following independence 
ending in 1997 during which time President Rahmon took power. Tajikistan has also 
experienced some unrest and civil conflict through the past decade.  
 Tajikistan is still struggling to establish itself after the end of the Soviet era and the 
internal conflict of its birth. An authoritarian government that arose out of a civil war, 
Tajikistan has been led for most of its history by a single leader. However, the strength of 
the government in light of that civil war and recent problems with unrest demonstrate that 
the central government’s control is questionable. Internal conflicts are of not only ideology, 
but also pre-existing sectarian divisions.150 These continue to exist and can be sources of 
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tension. Another weakness of the central government includes its inability to control major 
drug organizations within its borders. While many states – including great powers – struggle 
with this problem, Tajikistan’s government is incapable of any significant control or 
deterrent. The smuggling of heroin and opium has not significantly decreased, despite an 
increase in laws and statements by the government about stopping drugs according to UN 
data.151  
 Tajikistan has not had any energy resources to attract China’s attention, however 
with the Belt and Road Initiative the value of Dushanbe as an important ‘hub city’ in the 
network may mimic the value of an energy resource. A hub city is a specific singular factor 
that is not a commodity that China or Tajikistan can resell elsewhere which could cause a 
situation similar to Dutch disease152 in Tajikistan. It is integral to the functioning of the BRI, 
in a certain sense fueling the proposed flow of goods and services. It is only of value to 
China, making Tajikistan depending on China for any benefits gained from the status of a 
hub city. This could potentially lead to an arrangement where Tajikistan’s importance to 
China as its primary trade partner in this scenario is entirely dependent one this one factor. 
It would also mean that the economic benefits through development, trade, and services 
are dependent on that status of a hub city.  
While a hub city is entirely different than a reserve of oil or natural gas, the impact 
on Tajikistan’s economy and the way China deals with Tajikistan will function similarly. 
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Tajikistan’s economy is not terribly strong or stable with the largest portion coming from 
remittances, which also give it a similar Dutch disease effect. This leaves Tajikistan in a very 
weak bargaining position, and unlikely to see much development from China outside of 
Dushanbe or BRI related projects. China is unlikely to develop a larger market for Chinese 
goods in Tajikistan, although there may be an exception in the case of Dushanbe itself. 
Without much of value to export, Tajikistan is not currently an appealing trade partner for 
other wealthy nations. Combined with the unique value of Dushanbe, this would further 
weaken its bargaining position with China.  
In Tajikistan, China has new goals. While it had little to offer China before, 
Dushanbe’s proposed hub city status could change that. China needs a secure city with the 
infrastructure capacity to serve as a host city for businesses and officials as well as a 
throughway for commerce and trade. Based on China’s past patterns, they will build the 
infrastructure needed for these functions and supply the means to create a secure city. 
China has sold weapon systems in the past and allowed it companies’ facilities to be used by 
the local government for security operations and will likely do so again in Dushanbe. Also, in 
the name of securing their hub city China is likely to support President Rahmon’s regime 
and provide him assistance to keep the capital city stable at least. President Rahmon will 
welcome the influx of investment and development in his country given its weak economy. 
He will also welcome, perhaps even more so, the assistance with security and a 
strengthening of his government. Dushanbe’s value to China is unique to the BRI plan, so its 
value as a hub city is only to China. Tajikistan cannot look to other great powers to invest in 
Dushanbe. The weak bargaining position described earlier combined with the weaker 
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government and economy will likely result in a China having a dominant influence in 
Tajikistan. This means China’s goals inside the country are likely to succeed and that it will 
be less concerned or responsive to complaints or feedback from the Tajik people or 
government.  
 
A China-Dominant Central Asia 
China’s interest in Central Asia has previously focused on stable relations, with the 
secondary goal of extracting energy resources. China’s interaction with Central Asian states 
has largely been to secure oil or natural gas while keeping itself from being entangled in 
domestic issues or rivalries between states. However, with the Belt and Road Initiative, 
China has a new interest in Central Asia that would now make some states more important 
and appealing when before they were of little use because of their lack of energy resources, 
such as Tajikistan. It may also make avoiding deeper involvement, and potentially direct 
interference, in regional affairs impossible. Previously, China has been far more involved 
with Kazakhstan than the other states, building pipelines and securing deals for oil. 
However, with China’s desire for a ‘hub city’ in Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe, its need for 
roads and railways through multiple Central Asian countries, the focus on Kazakhstan is 
changing. China’s goals for BRI will require a closer relationship with a majority of Central 
Asian States, especially Tajikistan.  
China’s economic might will be wielded differently in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as 
both have different pre-existing economic conditions and China has different goals for each 
state. As we have seen in developing the model, domestic conditions determine the specific 
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ways that China’s will invested and develop states. Kazakhstan’s growing resource economy 
give it a stronger bargaining position with China, while Tajikistan’s weak economy and weak 
central government make it very vulnerable to China. However, the nature of what China 
needs from each state is also different, with primarily energy resources and accompanying 
infrastructure for Kazakhstan. For Tajikistan, the hub city will need much more varied 
infrastructure components to facilitate its purpose. The nature of the infrastructure being 
built will be different, but otherwise the strategy will be similar. In both cases, infrastructure 
development is the primary method to achieve China’s goals. In the case of Kazakhstan, 
with a stronger economy, that infrastructure may be more beneficial to Kazakhstan and 
allow it to flow energy resources back to westward regions. Tajikistan’s weaker bargaining 
position makes it likely that the hub city infrastructure will be built in a manner to make it of 
primary use to China and not Tajikistan, outside of its usefulness to China’s BRI project. 
For potential political influence, there will also be a large difference based the 
strength of each states bargaining position, although China will likely fall short of its political 
goals in both states. Increased economic interaction and trade ties will naturally develop a 
closer political relationship, but that does not necessarily mean greater influence. 
Kazakhstan, with its stronger position, is less likely to be pressured to follow Chinese 
political leadership. Instead, and this is a possibility through BRI, lasting political support for 
China will come, if China co-opts Kazakhstan through aligned interests. Making Kazakhstan 
and President Nazarbayev politically relevant allies of China through partnerships and 
returned political support may create deeper political ties between the two countries. 
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Kazakhstan is likely to only support China when it serves its national interest, which may not 
mean a significant increase in Chinese influence.  
In the case of Tajikistan, its relatively weaker bargaining position could make it far 
more dependent on China, especially if Dushanbe sees significant development and growth 
as a hub city. President Rahmon’s weaker central government could make him dependent 
on Chinese support to remain in power, creating powerful leverage for China that would 
certainly outlast initial economic development. These factors make China more likely to 
develop long lasting political influence with Tajikistan rather than Kazakhstan. Because of 
the common element of authoritarian regimes, China has the opportunity to create political 
influence that is not only tied to economic development through supporting each regime’s 
continued rule. This is also a tactic that China has used before. However, this political 
influence is not guaranteed to last beyond the life of these regimes. They could continue for 
decades, especially with outside support. However, if conflict and regime change occur 
sooner, that could quickly limit the life of political gains by China. Limitations on soft power, 
both in China’s capacity for soft power and in how receptive to it these states will be, mean 
that an internalization of China’s norms and a desire for cooperation with China is unlikely. 
Tajikistan may be especially likely to change support if it will strengthen President Rahmon’s 
regime.  
China is positioned to offer a great deal to both of these states and may secure a 
partnership with each that will be longer lasting. The ‘network’ aspect of BRI must also be 
considered. The infrastructure being improved upon and built in Kazakhstan, while focused 
on China of course, still connects to the West as well. Tajikistan’s hub city especially would 
66 
 
create interconnectedness with other states. Improved communications capacity, secure 
areas, business parks, shipping and business travel, all created for use by BRI participant 
nations, not only China. The BRI network is driven by China and mainly for the benefit of 
China. That unequal benefit combined with the individual bilateral agreements being 
worked out for BRI member states with a lack of transparency of the process still supports a 
dyadic approach to analyzing BRI. To understand BRI, we must look at it is a set of 
relationships between China and other states, not a large group of states with each other. 
The aspects of each individual state will still be the most important for determining China’s 
goals, strategies, and successes. However, the connection between these other states to 
each other through the BRI network must also be considered when judging the benefit to 
them and their government stability. While perhaps decreasing dependency specifically on 
China, it increases the appeal of the network and how Kazakhstan and Tajikistan can benefit 
from it. This may cause states, once invested and committed to the BRI and China, less likely 
to look to others, such as Russia. This could deepen the partnership between China and 
these states.  
Ultimately, there is potential for economic relationships and political support from 
China to create a platform for deeper political bonds and influence to form, but that 
platform just creates opportunity not certainty. The authoritarian and economic natures of 
these states make them vulnerable to Chinese influence through the needs of these regimes 
to create economic growth and increase state capacity to retain power. This same nature 
also limits the states’ receptiveness to soft power, restricting both the scope and duration 
of the influence. Perhaps the network aspect of BRI will mitigate this effect because the 
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interactions and relationships are institutionalized through a multi-national network instead 
of bilateral relations. Without more information about the still forming terms and 
mechanisms, the level of mitigation cannot be properly evaluated. BRI in Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan may achieve China’s immediate economic goals, but there is no certainty it will 
achieve any of its long term political goals and will not create any soft power influence. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 
With Beijing’s wiliness to be more assertive than in the past, and with the U.S. 
retreating from its Asia Pivot, there is a chance for China’s economic efforts to affect 
greater political change on the region than ever before, and possibly the international 
system. China has been successful being the ‘non-Western’ option for investment and 
development for many poorer regions. Now it seeks to do so again, but through a more 
structured and far-reaching economic model – a multinational coalition for trade and 
energy resources all under China’s lead. That leadership is a key goal of BRI and China’s new 
foreign policy approach. If successful, China will establish itself as the leading power in 
Central Asia. China provides funding, infrastructure development, and military aid, often 
without the conditions and strings that the Western powers add. It has more to offer the 
Central Asian states than Russia with its robust economy and access to the large Chinese 
consumer market for Central Asian goods. However, China’s economic power can wield 
enormous pressure to maximize China’s gains at the expense of greater benefits to the 
recipient states. Venezuela provides an example of how these deals can still become risky 
for China, but with Central Asia the greater risk will always be borne by the recipient state. 
Beijing’s standard requirements of Chinese labor and Chinese supplies to be used in its 
development projects may make for more reluctant partners and give Russia and the United 
States the potential to court the Central Asian states with new offers in order to protect 
their own interests in the region.  
We must avoid the assumption that a potential clash of national interests in Central 
Asia will lead to conflict between China and Russia. Through this analysis, a more detailed 
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picture appears of how China will develop connections with Central Asian nations and what 
kind of leadership of those states China might achieve. With different interests in the mix, 
some resolution will have to be reached, and certainly China is going to look for a more 
beneficial solution for themselves, but how successful they are will depend on the level of 
influence they achieve with the Central Asian states. China, Russia, and the United States all 
have incentives to avoid a military conflict. China and Russia have already begun having 
diplomatic meetings that could lead to a peaceful power sharing agreement in Central 
Asia.153 That is not to say this push by China will be without friction with the U.S. or Russia 
especially. There will be tensions and certainly economic competition, if not some economic 
conflict. The possibility of a mutually beneficial result of China’s push for the great powers 
involved is a highly optimistic one, but there are many layers of nuance between there and 
military conflict. This work has provided a more detailed description of how BRI will unfold 
in Central Asia and what changes that will create within the region. This will hopefully 
provide useful insight for future discussion on how Russia, the United States, and the 
international system will respond to China’s expansion.  
 
Russian Response 
 While China is not strictly a new player in Central Asia, the Belt and Road Initiative, 
combined with President Xi’s more active foreign policy approach, indicates China is moving 
from a hands-off investor to political competitor. President Putin has overseen a return to 
more adversarial Russia not afraid to act aggressively in foreign policy. Russia has not held 
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true dominance in Central Asia for some time, but Central Asia is still important to the 
Kremlin. Russia leads its own economic cooperative group, the Eurasian Economic Union, 
and would view the BRI as a direct competitor. Indeed, part of the purpose of the EEU is to 
counter the westward growth of China’s influence.154 Russia will certainly not be pleased 
with this expansion of China’s economic and political influence in Central Asia, but just how 
will it respond?  
 Sino-Russia relations have improved, starting with a series of agreements that 
defined how the two wary neighbors would co-exist together, culminating the almost 
alliance-like Treaty of Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001.155 Trade and 
cooperative development projects all increased and both sides have benefitted in specific 
cases from a friendlier stance towards each other. The states also have a common ground in 
often opposing the U.S. hegemonic system. For China, there is mostly optimism, stressing 
the importance of cooperating with Russia, although there is a sentiment that Russia is a 
partner born out of necessity rather than a trusted ally. Russian views are even more 
conflicted. Government officials praise good relations with China officially, but there is ever-
growing resentment and anxiety over China’s rise and Chinese immigration.156 China is 
currently the “most significant geopolitical challenge” to Russian dominance of Central Asia 
and is giving little consideration or concession to Moscow regarding security or economic 
policy in the region.157 Ultimately, China and Russia work together when their interests 
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align, but have no qualms being in opposition, acting neither as true partners or enemies. In 
this context, we can expect both states to avoid military conflict if possible, making that 
scenario highly unlikely without multiple escalating events changing their current 
relationship.  
Short of armed conflict then, the two most likely areas for conflict are economic and 
political. Russia has already demonstrated its skill at political propaganda. With the Russian 
language already ubiquitous in business in most Central Asian states, along with many 
Russian language media sources, Russia would have little trouble distributing anti-Chinese 
propaganda and creating political opposition to China’s initiatives. Central Asia was first 
under the dominance of the Russian Empire, and then became a collection of Soviet states 
under Russia’s influences as part of the USSR. Russia was ruling power in Central Asia 
staring with the period of the first Great Game in the early 19th century until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This considerable period of Russian rule as left a distinct 
lingering presence of Russian influence, culture, and language that would facilitate any 
actions Russia might take to counter China’s influence. These states also have trade ties 
with Russia and several of them, especially Tajikistan, have large inflows of remittances 
from their citizens working in Russia. These could all be used as leverage by Russia to 
encourage governments not to cooperate with Chinese initiatives.  
However, their shared Soviet history also works against Russia with many in Central 
Asia looking optimistically to China as an alternative to Russia, not the United States, 
especially if Beijing can alleviate the dependency on Russian sources of income such as the 
remittances. China has the economic upper hand, and it only needs to convince the 
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governments of these states, not necessarily a majority of their citizens. By offering 
economic growth that offsets anything lost with Russia, China has the capacity to mitigate 
the Russian advantages. Central Asian states are already agreeing to be a part of BRI, and 
once established Chinese influence will only become stronger as long as the BRI brings 
benefits. If Russia feels threatened enough, it may employ some set of undermining tactics 
against China’s influence in business and government as mentioned above, but they are 
more likely to benefit from another tactic, negotiation. Russia could concede, in this one 
dimension, that China will lead the way in Central Asia, in exchange for a few economic 
benefits of its own. Perhaps through the BRI Russia will get a portion of the energy 
resources from Kazakhstan, or equal trading terms from Central Asia states to what is 
negotiated with China. China may provide more direct compensation, or other forms of 
support. The Belt and Road Initiative will succeed and fail mostly on its own merits; the 
ability of China to actually lead this kind of economic cooperative, to balance between 
becoming mired in regional problems while maintain the security and stability of the trade 
routes and hub cities, and the mounting costs of walking that thin line. Russian efforts to 
undermine will not have a significant impact, the Chinese economic juggernaut fully 
committed by President Xi’s ambitions will not be deterred.  
But that does not mean BRI is necessarily destined to succeed. The lofty goals for BRI 
seem set too high for China to truly grasp, making limited success with some failure the 
more likely outcome. Perhaps Russian stands to gain the most by negotiating its own payoff 
from the project and then sitting back and watching China face the challenges that Russia, 
Great Britain, and the United States have struggled with in the past. China will have the 
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leverage to strongly encourage most Central Asian countries to agree to any terms it 
promises Russia, with the main exception of Kazakhstan. There is no reason that both 
strategies open to Russia cannot be employed if the propaganda campaigns are done with 
subtlety. It is also important to remember the Central Asia states are no simple pawns in a 
game, they have actively played great powers against each other before. These states are 
not truly subject to the dominance of “neo-colonialism” as they have China, Russia, and 
even the United States as options.158 While there is a current bias towards China, it is likely 
some countries will attempt to encourage countering offers to see what Russia might come 
up with. A state like Tajikistan may be very limited in this area, for the reasons previously 
described, while Kazakhstan is in the strongest position to encourage competition between 
Russia and China for its cooperation and energy resources. While Russia may even offer 
statements of cooperation and glad tidings for BRI, it will do little in the way of facilitating 
its success while hoping for, or even helping cause, failures for China along the way. Russia 
may seek to benefit itself from China’s economic successes while capitalizing on political 
losses without committing itself, especially militarily, to open opposition.  
 
Conclusion 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative signals three significant changes for Central Asia. 
First, that President Xi is leading China into a greater leadership role, both regionally and 
internationally. China, while still carefully avoiding direct interference, will be applying 
greater influence and pressure to the states in Central Asia. It may be providing economic 
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incentives to encourage states to follow its lead, and in the short term this is likely to be 
successful. Long term influence and leadership in Central Asia for China still faces many 
challenges depending on the success of China’s policies there and the reaction of Russia. 
Central Asian states will have to take Beijing’s wishes into greater consideration than before 
and face potential economic reprisals for opposition.  
Second, Central Asia may become the setting for a tug of war between great powers. 
China and Russia, while giving overtures of cooperation, are still most likely to come into 
political and economic conflict over China’s new role in the region, which Russia has 
historically seen as its own backyard. Presently, this great power competition is not likely to 
escalate into military action. The economic and political competition will elevate the 
importance of Central Asia while still providing opportunity for conflict that could 
destabilize the region, even if it is not military conflict. This may provide opportunity for 
Central Asian states to play the great powers against each other, but they will be doing so at 
great economic risk for themselves. With the improved infrastructure and markets that Belt 
and Road may create in Central Asia, other powers may seek to get involved as well, adding 
an uncertain element to the regions future. Additional tensions may come from nonstate 
actors in the region. Some in the general population are concerned about China’s practices 
and how they will affect the local economies. Additionally, Central Asia is predominately 
Muslim as are the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. Beijing’s treatment of the Uyghurs could become 
more important as its profile in Central Asia grows. If the perception of their policies 
towards the Uyghurs worsens, it could create dissent, violent protest, possibly even make 
Chinese firms and companies targets for attacks. Nearby Afghanistan has mired great 
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powers in the past, including Russia and the United States. Regardless of Russian or 
Western interests in the region, through Belt and Road, China is positioning itself as the 
investor to beat, which will change the politics of the region and garner more attention 
internationally.  
Third, there will be a great uncertainty about the future of China’s interest in Central 
Asia. With the obstacles present to China’s political and soft power goals through the BRI, 
there may be a half-life to the full backing of the BRI project. China needs something to 
continue its domestic economic growth. If Belt and Road fails to generate this growth, in 
addition to greater political power, China may carefully reduce the size and scope of the 
project, which will have an especially large impact on Tajikistan if it pulls funding and stops 
future development projects in Dushanbe. Additionally, if BRI provides temporary growth 
domestically, but a new solution arises, China may move on from the BRI network, again 
creating a limited timeframe for positive benefits for Central Asia from the BRI. Kazakhstan 
will be in a strong position to continue growth and maintain stability, while other states 
such as Tajikistan will at best see economic decline while at worst face collapse after one of 
the legs propping up an authoritarian regime is removed. China may want to avoid 
instability in the region to the degree it would not allow the full collapse of the Tajikistan 
government, but without it providing value to China anymore, Beijing will not prop up the 
economy. 
How Belt and Road plays out in Central Asia will have important repercussions for 
states in the region, for Sino-Russian relations, and ultimately for the international 
community. President Xi is leading China to a greater role on the international stage, and 
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how its behaves in Central Asia will provide important cues to what kind of great power 
China will become. Beijing’s deals with Central Asian states will set precedents for future 
bilateral deals in other regions of the Belt and Road. With President Xi’s willingness to take 
greater risks China will become more involved, and entangled, abroad. While China’s hands-
off approach to other state governments and domestic policies will continue, it will exert 
pressure on economic negotiations and international politics. With Belt and Road’s 
domestic aspects, Beijing will be forced to involve itself directly in other states in order to 
protect its domestic interests should anything in the recipient state threaten them. With a 
considerable number of the Belt and Road states in a state of precarious stability, it is very 
likely that China will have to face this problem at some point. A government collapse, 
violent protests that threaten Chinese assets and citizens, and civil war are all examples of 
problems that China could have previously avoided but may now have to face. As it 
solidifies its ascension, China will have to face the challenges that have plagued great 
powers in the past, which may come through Belt and Road. How Chinese foreign policy will 
unfold through BRI will indicate how it will act in other regions around the world with its 
new ambitions, especially in how it responds to failure of some of those ambitions.  
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